Sri Lanka port city becomes financial city, new deal by August: PM

nimantha80

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http://www.lankabusinessonline.com/sri-lanka-port-city-becomes-financial-city-new-deal-by-august-pm/

nimantha80

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Vat or capital gain or whatever these guys will deliver within one year.

samaritan

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Financial City or Fun City let us see something happening for God's sake. Fed up of this Jazz.......

Have we forgotten Smart City, Smart Nation etc......

samaritan

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Hope we will not be left with a Ghost City at the end. Sri Lanka port city becomes financial city, new deal by August: PM Icon_lol

Chinwi

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“We will convert the port city to a financial city filling the gap between Singapore and Dubai,” Wickremesinghe said.

නවකතා කෙටිකතා ලියන්න පටන් ගත්ත නම් ගානක් හොයා ගත්තහැකි වගේ.

හීන නම් ලොකුවටම බලනව ආසාවේ බෑ. වැඩ තමයි බැරි.

අපට පිරවීම සඳහා සිංගප්පූරුව හා ඩුබායි අතර දැනට ඇතිවෙලා තියෙන ෆිනෑන්ශල් ගැප් එක කුමක්ද කියල දන්න කෙනෙක් කියනවද ?

Can anybody educate us about the existing financial Gap between Dubai and Singapore ?
Because our leaders are going to fill that gap.

devinda

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[size=32]Sri Lanka: Avoiding 'the road' to Greece![/size]
June 12, 2016, 9:23 pm

Sri Lanka port city becomes financial city, new deal by August: PM Clip_image001

Sri Lanka port city becomes financial city, new deal by August: PM Clip_image001

By C.R. de Silva,
Retired World Bank Professional,
USA

Economic Situation

On the occasion, earlier in June, of the IMF Executive Board's approval of a USD 1.5 billion 'extended arrangement' (meaning simply, an instalment loan) under the Extended Fund Facility for Sri Lanka, the Central Bank Governor ArjunaMahendra made a public statement that "over the last decade export revenues have dropped drastically, amounting to less than 15% of GDP ... the government was seeking to sell as much as USD 3 billion in bonds in 2016 ... the rupee is trading near a record low following worsening foreign exchange reserves and a Balance of Payments (BOP) crunch forced the Central Bank to stop propping up the currency". Much more accurately, it is actually more a condition of the IMF operation that the government allow the rupee to float and find its true value in order "to show a clear commitment to exchange rate flexibility"!

The governor's summary statement quoted above does not convey any sense of the current financial crisis or paint a true picture of the country's dire economic situation, which has received much local print publicity already . Analysts have pointed to the uncertain prospects for speedy recovery of the Sri Lankan economy in the immediate future in view of the deteriorating balance of payments, caused inter alia by increased import volumes, a recent and persistent trend of diminishing exports and reducing workers' remittances (the largest foreign exchange earner for the economy), an inadequate revenue base and huge external debts and servicing obligations.

The IMF, too, in its loan announcement glossed over the gravity of the current economic scenario, leaving open room for more intrusive policy intervention in the future by observing that "despite positive growth momentum, Sri Lanka's economy is beginning to show signs of strain from an increasingly difficult external environment and challenging policy adjustments ...." Was the steep decline in the import price of petroleum, which brought substantial budgetary relief construed as a "difficult external environment?" So, it was not mismanagement of the economy that has caused the crisis but the increasingly difficult external environment! What "policy adjustments" were being referred to are also unclear. To add to the confusion, The World Bank has forecast current GDP growth at 5.4%.

The recent directive of a cash-strapped government ordering the country's exporters to repatriate their foreign exchange immediately is not only a critical move to reinforce Sri Lanka's external liquidity and improve BOP fundamentals but also sadly amounts to a withdrawal from the free market system the country enjoyed for many years. It also points to a turn in the road to a more controlled, less liberal policy regime, having agreed otherwise with the IMF on "a decisive shift towards an outward orientation".

Another good test of the health of an economy is the amount of foreign exchange reserves the country holds, which evidences its ability to import food and other essential commodities for its people, especially in the case of a highly import-dependent economy such as Sri Lanka. At present, the country's foreign exchange reserves amount to just over USD 6 billion, most of it borrowed from overseas, adequate for 3 1/2 months food imports. This may be contrasted with the foreign reserves of India (up to USD 360 billion), Malaysia (USD 137 billion), Indonesia (USD 105 billion), and Taiwan, a country of similar geographic size and population (USD 420 billion).

At the launch of the Central Bank's 2015 Annual Report recently, the principal author commented that the "government is forced to have recourse to borrowings even for its day-to-day operations, because the country's revenue is not enough even to finance the government's maintenance expenditures". The IMF mischaracterizes such an economy as "one beginning to show signs of strain"?

IMF's Instalments

Consequently, in response to a government request for a financial bail-out, and as stated earlier, the IMF has just extended a so-called "arrangement" amounting to USD 1.5 billion for Sri Lanka under a three-year IMF-agreed programme. In actual practice, however, the first USD tranche of this operation which has just been released to the Central Bank amounts only to USD 168 million, which is to be followed by instalments of about USD 222 million, twice every year over the next three years, upon prior IMF satisfaction that the difficult conditions agreed with the government have been met.

One obvious comment is that these small IMF cash instalments are relatively insignificant amounts compared to the country's huge current foreign exchange needs just for external debt servicing, amounting to several billion dollars during the next twelve months and also will have no meaningful impact on the adverse balance of payments position or on the country's meagre foreign exchange reserves, although the government is obligated to carry out several unpopular and difficult financial reforms even to qualify for these very limited cash inflows. The government’s unpopularity on the street is, indeed, a steep price to pay for such handouts, as is normal in any IMF bail-out situation.

IMF's Role

In its Press Release, the IMF made a dramatic argument that its intervention would magically open doors i.e. catalyze multilateral (World Bank and ADB) and bilateral aid amounting to another USD 650 million. It is very well known that the World Bank as well as ADB and the bilateral donors the IMF refers to have established lending and aid programmes, respectively, in Sri Lanka for decades, and have not suddenly become active upon the IMF bestowing its 'good housekeeping' seal of approval on Sri Lanka. The two multilateral institutions operate generally on a project by project basis, implying that cash disbursements are spread out over 5 years or more for each project, and they function under the independent authority of their own Executive Boards, just like the bilateral aid of friendly sovereign governments, all of which have been assisting Sri Lanka on a very regular basis and with large loan amounts, regardless of IMF arrangements which seek to offer a small infusioin of dollars every six months.

IMF's Downside

Qualifying for these IMF funds entail the Sri Lankan authorities jumping over major, mostly unpopular, hurdles that usher in short-term public pain; and in many countries like Greece, have required progressive degrees of austerity and resulted finally in recession. Ultimately, in some countries like Greece, there would be more bailouts down the road!

For example, higher VAT at 15% will act as a brake on consumer demand and slow economic growth. In Greece, VAT is now at 25% under the IMF programme, and after forcing deep austerity, has accelerated an economic recession in that country. Increased VAT in Sri Lanka has made telecommunication services more expensive countrywide for everyone, and has slowed down the growth in ICT revenues, especially exports, depriving the country of substantial revenues in foreign exchange; and also made healthcare services more expensive and less affordable to the poor and the aging.

Foreign Direct Investment

A more desirable avenue to encourage dollar inflows is foreign investment. But, the country's dire economic situation described above, as well as the unfavourable evaluations of the principal credit rating agencies earlier this year may certainly have motivated the prolonged net outflow of private foreign investment from the local stock market. While the importance of substantial foreign direct capital investment (FDI) in various sectors of the economy cannot be over-emphasized as a foundation for economic diversification, the World Bank in a recent report has described FDI in Sri Lanka as being at a disappointing level despite numerous fiscal incentives being offered, resulting in levels here being far below those in peer countries.

Bond Option

In order to ameliorate the difficult situation described above, the government's plan appears to be to issue sovereign bonds totalling billions of dollars in every available market, both external and domestic, including the very possible issue of such bonds in other currencies like the Renminbi in Beijing, to raise funds to meet external debt service obligations. Although the government has agreed with the IMF "on a more effective control over expenditures", unfortunately, there does not appear to be a realization that this vicious cycle of borrowing by issuing bonds, which seems inevitable in the present circumstances, is complemented by a concerted and conscientious effort to adopt meaningful austerity measures to conserve government revenue.

Lack of any austerity

Sri Lanka port city becomes financial city, new deal by August: PM Clip_image002

For example, the very next day after the IMF staff announcement of the USD 1.5 billion in assistance, it was announced that tender offers would be called by the Air Force for the supply of fighter jets, etc at an estimated cost of USD 400 million and that a Russian lending source was being explored for the purchase of military equipment for the army and the police through a USD 300-400 million line of credit. These projected outlays would immediately account for more than one half of the total three-year IMF assistance, long before these provisionally agreed funds are ever actually transferred to Sri Lanka. The public conviction remains, however, that the civil war ended six years ago!

The government's most recent splurge, in these cash-strapped days, was a supplementary estimate for Rs. 1.2 billion for importing 30 limousines for Cabinet Ministers! The Island eloquently editorialized on that occasion: "With the colossal amount of public funds being wasted on cars for Ministers and MPs, who are already using luxury vehicles at the expense of taxpayers, all the houses and shops destroyed by the recent military camp blasts (as well as by the damaging floods) could have been rebuilt. How can the government politicians justify their panhandling near foreign embassies, claiming that they are without funds to help disaster victims? ... Hospitals are seeking public assistance to buy scanners and other such equipment. Life-savings drugs are in short supply perennially in the state-run health institutions ... Most schools are without sanitary facilities. University students are not paid their stipends on time. Development projects have ground to a halt due to lack of funds. But the government has enough and more funds to purchase cars for its M.P.s" (9.5.2016)

Tax Issues

While the IMF has correctly emphasized that the mobilization of higher tax revenues is a sine qua non in this difficult fiscal situation, no attempt has been made to reverse the Finance Minister's end-2015 budgetary relaxation of the minimum taxable income level from Rs. 600,000 per year earlier to a much higher threshold of Rs. 2.6 million, exempting the large mass of small entrepreneurs and businesses from paying income tax. Nor the regressive 15% general rate of income tax which makes life easier for the ever-widening class of mostly urban affluent that throng the expensive restaurants of five-star Colombo hotels and every classy tourist resort.

Furthermore, an application by a conscientious objector recently made to the Supreme Court seeks to review a policy decision recently made to exempt all 225 Members of Parliament from paying customs duties and taxes on cars imported by them up to a landed value of USD 62,500 each, which qualifies the most expensive luxury vehicles available for purchase from being imported tax-free, resulting in a net loss of revenue to the government amounting to many millions of rupees, which is revenue the government can ill afford to sacrifice in these difficult times.

Whither Sri Lanka?

Where does the scenario articulated above take the country in the next months and years in terms of its economic and financial viability, leave alone generating cash savings to finance high priority projects, and advance the ever-important cause of developing the country? Sri Lanka's scary current economic situation brings to mind the recent crises which continues to afflict another democratically elected government in a more developed country, Greece, a country of only 11 million people, where, too, the government lived way beyond its means, raised billions in foreign exchange by issuing bonds in every conceivable market, a strategy which became progressively more expensive in interest rate terms - causing the value of its own currency to crash, an inability to meet the demands of its external and domestic creditors, leading to a run on its local banks, and a series of bail-outs not only by the IMF but by the EEC, a principal creditor.

The Greek Crisis

The origins and continuing trauma of Greece's continuing financial impasse should be revelatory for policymakers in Sri Lanka, who are themselves issuing sovereign bonds to roll over external debt service payments wherever funds are available, to the virtual exclusion of seriously enhancing revenue and strictly controlling expenditures. Following the great global depression in 2008, it became known that Greece had been understating the extent of its deficit financing for many years. This disclosure led to Greece being shut off from global financial markets, and by 2010 was unable to rollover its debt by issuing new sovereign bonds, as Sri Lanka is doing now, and was on the verge of bankruptcy.

The IMF and European financial authorities in two bail-outs loaned Greece a total of about USD 350 billion, which as in the case of the IMF operation in Sri Lanka, came with the usual harsh conditionality, which is the standard IMF recipe - deep budget cuts, severe austerity in expenditure and major tax increases - amounting to an overhaul of its entire economy. For example, the tax on heating oil was increased by 450%, worsening the public's trauma. As is the expectation in Sri Lanka, the IMF/EEC bail-outs were expected to stabilise the Greek economy and its finances, but the overall effect of the conditionality was to contract the economy by 25% and sharply raise unemployment to a similar level.

While the IMF/EEC bail-out funds for Greece largely paid off external lenders, another familiar IMF objective, the economy itself did not benefit from these cash infusions and did not lead to an economic recovery. Greece has now got the green light for another round of bailouts, providing funds that will allow the country to keep paying its bills in the coming months. Debt relief for Greece is also on the cards, but has become a contentious issue, with the IMF insisting that Greece cannot meet its domestic fiscal goals without its debts being eased, while its European creditors, mainly Germany, are sceptical about Greek financial discipline, given the past. Germany is insisting on a ludicrous target of 3.5% of GDP for Greek budgetary deficits, the same level that Sri Lanka has already agreed with the IMF to reach most unrealistically by 2020, from a 7.4% level today.

Conclusion

Where does all this leave countries which have lived beyond their means? By 2013, after years of austerity, more than one-third of Greeks were living below the poverty line. Government wages and pensions have so far been cut 12 times. By 2014, Greece's GDP had declined by a catastrophic 27%! Defaults on commercial bank loans rose to an astounding 45%; and close to one half of Greek families had no adult in employment. Small businesses have been crushed by punitive taxes, shades of increased VAT in Sri Lanka, now at 24% in Greece. Hospitals in Greece are running out of basic necessities. In Athens today, only the soup kitchens are flourishing. (The above facts on Greece are mostly derived from the writings of a former Finance Minister, who is now a Professor of Economics at the University of Athens).

What are the important lessons that less sophisticated developing countries can learn from the continuing Greek economic tragedy, which has unfolded despite IMF (and EEC) policy prescriptions, austerity measures and huge bail-outs during the course of six years? Objective, sincere and effective policy advice is very hard to come by in today's complex globalized world, where money lenders, by any other name, have to safeguard the continuation of their own business interests, too, in a shrinking client milieu, especially in booming Asia, where countries in trouble, seeking financial rescue are very scarce. Sri Lankan macro-economic policy and micro-development experts of world class, litter many foreign university campuses, think tanks and multilateral lending agencies, but the government has hitherto failed to use this valuable resource for the benefit of the country. It is high time such expertise was enlisted before it is too late. At present, the government cannot even hold a well qualified and highly experienced environmental scientist with World Bank credentials, to help direct the conservation of our wildlife resources, for more than three months!

Finally, we cannot do better than repeat a recent banner headline from a local financial newspaper - Timeodanaosetdonaferentes! In the case of Sri Lanka, however, it will not be the Greeks who are bringing gifts! They have none anymore, to give anyone!

Excessive credit growth calls for further monetary policy tightening
2016-06-17 00:00:25
In view of the inflationary pressures and high import demand that arose from the easy money policy, the Central Bank began to adopt a tight monetary policy early this year.
While it has helped to mitigate demand pressures to a certain extent as elaborated in my last week’s column, excessive bank credit supply to the private sector continues to persist. Hence, it has become imperative to further tighten monetary policy to mop up excess liquidity so as to arrest core inflation and to curb import demand.

Policy Rate hike
The Central Bank had reduced its policy rates continuously since December 2012, as shown in Exhibit 1. The Standing Deposit Facility Rate or SDFR (rate applicable for placement of overnight excess funds of commercial banks)was brought down in several steps from 7.75 percent in April 2012 to 6.00 percent in April 2015. The Standing Lending Facility Rate or SLFR (rate applicable for lending of overnight funds to commercial banks) was reduced from 9.75 percent to 7.50 percent during the same period.

Departing from the relaxed policy stance, the Central Bank tightened monetary operations in January by raising the Statutory Reserve Ratio (SRR) from 6.0 percent to 7.5 percent. This was followed by an increase in the Standing Deposit Facility Rate and Standing Lending Facility Rate by 50 basis points to 6.5 percent and 8.0 percent, respectively in February.

In line with the increase in policy rates, the market rates which were at low levels have begun to rise as reflected in the commercial banks’ Average Weighted Prime Lending Rate (AWPR).

Treasury Bill and Bond yields up
The yield rates on government securities too have risen since last year. The Treasury Bill rate rose significantly in the primary market in March last year due to the removal of restrictions placed on the SDF by the Central Bank and market anticipations for higher government borrowing requirements in the midst of a slowdown in foreign capital inflows. The Central Bank claims that its decision to issue government securities only through public auctions also contributed to the upward shift of the yield rates reflecting market realities.

The yield rates in the secondary market rose in recent months as shown in Exhibit 2. At the shorter end, the 91-day Treasury Bill rate rose to 8.60 percent in end-May 2016 from 6.06 percent a year ago. The 10-year Treasury Bond rate was up from 8.86 percent to 12.29 percent.

Relaxed monetary policy created credit bubble
The cumulative effects of the loose monetary policy on private sector credit growth were evident from mid-2014 onwards as shown in Exhibit 3. The average annual increase of commercial bank credit to the private sector was high as much as 27 percent in the first quarter of this year.

The government borrowings from the banking sector too shows an increasing trend since mid-2014. As the government security market experiences a capital outflow since last year, similar to other emerging market economies, there is an increasing burden on the domestic Treasury Bill and Bond markets. Nevertheless, bank lending to the government has declined since the latter part of last year reflecting lesser monetary accommodation.
The impact of the rapid increase in bank credit was reflected in the broad money supply which rose at a year-on-year growth rate of 19 percent in March 2016 compared with a 13 percent growth a year ago. The faster growth of money

supply has led to exert demand pressures on inflation and consumer goods imports.

Low interest rates did not boost investment
The easy monetary policy did not bring about any boost to investment or to GDP growth, as expected. It is rather unwise to anticipate an increase in private investment merely by means of low interest rates, as there are so many other economic and non-economic factors that influence investment.

Business decisions are mostly based on comparisons between the expected rate of return on investment and opportunity cost of investment.
Interest rates represent the opportunity cost. Expectations are influenced by many factors including macroeconomic economic environment, technological changes, exchange rate volatility, capacity utilization, export competitiveness, aggregate demand, fiscal stability, inflation, political stability, business confidence, availability of credit and cost of production.
Given the country’s poor track record on most of those attributes, domestic investment remained stagnant despite the reduction in interest rates.
Following the cessation of the war, private sector investment showed a gradual increase from 17.3 percent of GDP in 2009 to 22.4 percent by 2012. Since then it has stagnated at
the same level reflecting non-response of private investment to interest rate cuts.

Demand pressures on inflation and imports
The low interest rate environment encouraged consumption, as savings gave low returns. Thus, low interest rates had a dampening effect on domestic savings. This is reflected in the downfall of domestic savings ratio from 24.6 percent of GDP in 2013 to 22.6 percent in 2015.
As the low interest rate policy was coupled with a less-flexible exchange rate system until last year, there was bias towards imports vis-à-vis exports thus, overburdening the balance of payments. The overvalued rupee and low interest rates made imported goods relatively cheaper. The influx of consumer durables, particularly vehicle imports, in recent years amply validates this point.

Speculative transactions thrived
It is empirically found in many countries that pushing down interest rates on financial instruments to low levels by monetary authorities leads to distort investment decisions and to create asset bubbles. The surplus-fund holders tend to move to different alternative assets such as commodities, real estate and risky financial instruments.
Meanwhile, speculators are encouraged by low interest rates to borrow funds and acquire assets in the monetary loosening environment. This kind of boom in short-term profit making results in a surge of asset prices leading to “asset bubbles”, thus creating adverse effects on financial stability as experienced by the East Asian countries during the financial crisis in the late 1990s.

Monetary tightening imperative
The recent shift in monetary policy towards contractionary stance along with rupee depreciationis inevitable to curb the excessive credit demand from the private sector entities and individuals for purposes such as luxury goods imports and speculative trading which had no bearing on productive investment or GDP growth. Continuation of low interest rate policy coupled with an overvalued rupee would have led the country towards a deep financial crisis. The current trends indicate that market liquidity continues to remain high despite the rate hike, and therefore, further monetary tightening is essential.
Meanwhile, the expansionary effects of government’s bank borrowings on the money supply cannot be underestimated. The budget deficit is projected to remain around 5 of GDP in the medium-term implying large borrowing requirements.

Although certain tax revisions have been introduced recently to augment the revenue, no effective steps have been taken yet to cut down government expenditure. Monetary policy needs
to be supported by fiscal consolidation with bold steps to prune unproductive public expenditure.
(Prof. SirimevanColombage,
an economist, academic and former senior central banker, can be reached at sscolom@gmail.com)

CDB heralds exceptional financial performance on 20th anniversary
2016-06-15 00:00:17

Celebrating its 20th anniversary as a harbinger of change and trailblazing forerunner in the Non-bank financial institution (NBFI) sector in Sri Lanka, Citizens Development Business Finance PLC (CDB) reported exceptional financial results for FY 2015/16, revelling in its innovative persona, corporate stewardship and incomparable team.
The entity’s impressive track record in sustainable financial performance has built a robust and resilient foundation that has enabled the company to be fearless and holistic in its approach. This was well evidenced in the recognition it received from the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce which placed CDB among the Ten Best Corporate Citizens of 2015 and the winner in the Below Rs.5 billion Revenue Category, two feats that were added to the ever increasing kudos that CDB continues to collate.
CDB Managing Director/CEO Mahesh Nanayakkara articulates that CDB has affirmed its strong presence even more with this year’s results. “CDB’s reputation as a financial entity that has continued to be consistent in its financial performance is well demonstrated in the impressive milestones we notched this year. The balance sheet surpassed the Rs.50 billion mark, detailed at Rs.50.6 billion and reflecting a growth of 33 percent, positioning CDB among the largest NBFIs in the country.”
He detailed that profit after tax too showcased a remarkable upward trajectory, positioning itself beyond the Rs.1 billion milestone, which is a growth of 43 percent. Revenue is recorded at Rs.7.5 billion, inclining 8 percent.
Net interest income is recorded at Rs.3 billion, which is an increase of 7 percent, while impairment charges and disposal deficits are Rs.399 million, reflecting a reduction of Rs.281 million or by 41 percent. The loan book recorded a growth of 31 percent standing at Rs.38.5 billion. The narrowing of net interest margins from 8.0 percent to 6.9 percent in comparison to last year was a result of the conscious strategy adopted by CDB to change the composition of the lending mix.
The direct positive outcome of this strategy has been that both gross and net non-performing loan ratios reduced from 5.8 percent to 3.6 percent and 3.2 percent to 1.6 percent, respectively, which resulted in the reduction of impairment charges. The deposit base grew by 14 percent to be posted at Rs.30.8 billion, while debt funding, which became the main source of funding, heralded a growth of Rs.7.5 billion, an increase of an impressive 156 percent. Cost to income ratio stood at 57.58 percent
Total equity surpassed the Rs.5 billion mark, while Tier I and Tier II in the capital adequacy ratios stood at 11.72 percent and 11.74 percent, respectively, well above regulatory requirements. The liquidity ratio at 20.04 percent too was above the regulatory requirement level. Ninety one percent of assets are in interest bearing regular cash flow generating investments including the asset backed loan book consisting of 76 percent of assets.
Profit before VAT on financial services, NBT and the crop levy is notched at Rs.1.43 billion, stipulating an incline of 36 percent, where profit before income tax stands at Rs.1.25 billion. This is an increase of 32 percent. Return on equity recorded 21.78 percent, while earnings per share stands at Rs.18.51. The net book value per share is now Rs.93.03 as per the balance sheet date.
CDB’s specialized leasing subsidiary changed its name to Unisons Capital Leasing Ltd (UCL) during the year. CDB fully subscribed to the rights issue announced by UCL during the FY 2015/16 investing Rs.82.1mn at Rs.10.50 per share, which increased CDB’s stake in UCL to 90.38 percent. For this financial year, UCL contributed Rs.15.6 million towards the group’s consolidated results. Judging by the positive trends already experienced, we expect UCL to make a significant contribution to the group’s bottom line in the coming years.

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Sri Lanka port city becomes financial city, new deal by August: PM

1 Sri Lanka port city becomes financial city, new deal by August: PM Fri Jun 17, 2016 5:26 pm

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